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Abstract
We report constructing quantum games directly from a system of Bell’s inequalities using
Arthur Fine’s analysis published in early 1980s. This analysis showed that such a system of
inequalities forms a set of both necessary and sufficient conditions required to find a joint
distribution function compatible with a given set of joint probabilities, in terms of which the
system of Bell’s inequalities is usually expressed. Using the setting of a quantum correlation
experiment for playing a quantum game, and considering the examples of Prisoners’ Dilemma
and Matching Pennies, we argue that this approach towards constructing quantum games
addresses some of their well known criticisms.
Keywords: quantum games, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Nash equilibrium, quan-
tum correlation experiments, joint probability, quantum probability
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the area of quantum games [1–47]. It seems
that there is now an agreement that construction of a quantum game can be achieved along
several possible routes [3, 5, 13, 18, 27, 35, 40, 47]. The unifying idea underpinning these routes
appears to consist of establishing a link between the classical feature of a physical system, shared
by participating players and that facilitates the physical implementation of the game, and the
classical game, so that a classical game results because of those features. It turns out that this link
takes the form of constraints placed on the (statistical) properties of the shared physical system.
A quantum game is then obtained by replacing the classical features of the shared physical system
with the quantum ones, while retaining the mentioned link. Subsequently, one investigates the
impact the quantum feature(s) may have on the solution/outcome of the game.
As the mentioned link between the classical features of shared physical system and the resulting
classical game can be established in several possible ways, there can exist many routes in obtaining
a quantum game. In the context of non-cooperative games this results in an interesting situation
that one route to quantize a game can provide a new quantum mechanical Nash equilibrium (NE1)
that is different from the one which another quantization route provides. In Bleiler’s words [40]
comparing one route to another is similar to comparing apples and oranges.
For instance, in Eisert et al.’s scheme [5] for quantizing a game, the classical game corresponds
to an initial product quantum state, which the players share for its local unitary manipulation and
its later measurement. In Marinatto and Weber’s (MW) quantization scheme [13] the classical
game corresponds to the product initial state |00〉, as a pure state is forwarded to player for its
local manipulation by the identity Iˆ and Pauli σˆx operators before the final state is measured.
The link that Eisert et al.’s quantization scheme establishes between the classical game and
a product initial state (representing the ‘classicality’ of shared physical system) does not seem
entirely convincing. It is because a product initial state leads to a classical game but the classical
game can also result when players locally maneuver a maximally entangled state with special
1In the rest of this paper we use NE to mean Nash Equilibrium or Nash Equilibria. The correct meaning is to
be judged from the context.
unitary actions. Likewise, the relationship which the MW’s scheme establishes between the clas-
sical game and the product initial state |00〉 does not appear convincing as a quantum game can
correspond to a pure initial state that does not violate Bell’s inequality.
It is true that in these quantization schemes a classical game is embedded in the quantum
game, but the respective embeddings do not ensure that a quantum game results only when
relevant Bell’s inequalities are violated. Along with these observations, Benjamin and Hayden [8]
pointed out that in the Eisert et al.’s quantization scheme players’ unitary actions are arbitrarily
restricted and are not even closed under composition. Also, referring to the same quantization
formalism, Flitney and Hollenberg [37] pointed out that the new NE and the classical-quantum
transitions that occur are simply an artifact of the particular strategy space chosen. Also, Enk
and Pike’s [10] remarked that as the scheme involves players having access to strategy sets that
are not available to them in the classical game, it makes sense to equate the quantum game to an
extended classical game constructed by adding extra pure strategies in the game matrix.
In an effort to reply to these observations we proposed [33,35,43,44] the setting of a quantum
correlation experiment [48–53] for playing a quantum game. The quantum game is played between
two remotely located agents/observers Alice and Bob who can perform measurements on parts of
a particle that has disintegrated into two. Alice and Bob each are given two directions in which
measurements are performed. In a run, each agent performs a measurement along one of the
two directions, whose outcome is a dichotomic variable. A players’ strategy is the probability
distribution of choosing between the two available directions.
A quantum correlation experiment seems to provide a natural setting for a two-player two-
strategy (2 × 2) quantum game. It is because a player has to decide a pure strategy in each run
and the probability distribution over pure strategies defines a player’s (mixed) strategy that is
definable over many runs. Referring to the quantum correlation experiment, we can identify the
agents Alice and Bob as players and assign the two available directions to correspond to a player’s
pure strategies. Players’ payoffs are then expressed in terms of the joint probabilities relevant to
the shared physical systems, their moves or strategies, and the entries in the matrix that defines
the game.
In the present paper we present a new approach for construction of quantum games that, once
again, uses the setting of quantum correlation experiments. We propose that a quantum game
corresponding to a classical game should satisfy the following two requirements: a) so as to avoid
Enk and Pike type argumentation [10] the strategy sets available to the players are identical in both
the quantum and the corresponding classical game, b) the quantization procedure should establish
a convincing relation between the classicality of the shared physical system, as it is expressed by
a relevant system of Bell’s inequalities [61], and the classical game. We show that when the
classicality of a shared physical system is defined [61] in terms of a system of Bell’s inequalities
it allows us to establish such a relationship. We refer, in this connection, to the results reported
by Fine [63] in early 1980s and build up our arguments on them. These results are known to
be significant with reference to joint distributions, quantum correlations, and a system of Bell’s
inequalities, all of which are relevant to the setting of quantum correlation experiments that we
use to play quantum games.
2 Two-player two-strategy games
Consider a two-player two-strategy game
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S′1 S
′
2[
(a1, b1) (a2, b2)
(a3, b3) (a4, b4)
]
, (1)
in which S1,2 and S
′
1,2 are Alice’s and Bob’s pure strategies, respectively, whereas ai are Alice’s
and bj are Bob’s payoffs. For instance, we use ΠA(S2, S
′
1) to denote Alice’s payoff when she plays
S2 while Bob plays S
′
1, which is a3 from the Table (1). In a mixed-strategy game, we denote by
x the probability with which Alice chooses her pure strategy S1. She then chooses S2 with the
probability (1 − x). Similarly, we denote by y the probability with which Bob chooses S′1. He
then chooses S′2 with the probability (1 − y). In this case we write Alice’s payoff by ΠA(x, y)
and Bob’s payoff by ΠB(x, y) i.e. the first entry in bracket is for Alice and the second for Bob.
For a symmetric game we have a1 = b1, a4 = b4, a2 = b3, and a3 = b2, for which one obtains
ΠA(x, y) = ΠB(y, x). The inequalities
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) > 0, ΠB(x⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) > 0, (2)
describe that the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) is a NE.
3 Quantum games using correlation experiments
In the setting of quantum correlation experiments [35], which we use to play a quantum version
of the game (1), players Alice and Bob are located in space-time regions R1 and R2, respec-
tively. Ideally these regions are spacelike separated. Alice can perform measurements on two
bivalent observables (with values ±1) A1 and A2 in region R1. Similarly, player Bob can perform
measurements on two bivalent observables (with values ±1) B1 and B2 in region R2.
Referring to the matrix (1) we make the associations A1 ∼ S1, A2 ∼ S2 and B1 ∼ S′1, B2 ∼
S′2 and take
△1 = (a3 − a1), △2 = (a4 − a2), △3 = (△2 −△1). (3)
We then consider the joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2) and denote P (A1B2),
for example, the probability that both the observable A1 and B2 take the value +1. Similarly,
we denote P (A1B¯2) for the joint probability when the observable A1 takes the value +1 and the
observable B2 takes the value −1.
For the matrix game (1) played in the setting of quantum correlation experiments the payoff
relations are expressed [35] as
ΠA,B(x, y) =
[
x
1− x
]T [
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2)
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2)
] [
y
1− y
]
, (4)
where T is transpose and subscripts A and B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively. In (4) we define
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) = (a, b)1P (A1B1) + (a, b)2P (A1B¯1) + (a, b)3P (A¯1B1) + (a, b)4P (A¯1B¯1),
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2) = (a, b)1P (A1B2) + (a, b)2P (A1B¯2) + (a, b)3P (A¯1B2) + (a, b)4P (A¯1B¯2),
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) = (a, b)1P (A2B1) + (a, b)2P (A2B¯1) + (a, b)3P (A¯2B1) + (a, b)4P (A¯2B¯1),
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2) = (a, b)1P (A2B2) + (a, b)2P (A2B¯2) + (a, b)3P (A¯2B2) + (a, b)4P (A¯2B¯2).
(5)
where (a, b)2, for example, is shortened notation for a2, b2—the entries in the matrix (1).
Although players’ payoffs (4) depend on the joint probabilities corresponding to the shared
physical system, the players’ moves, represented by x and y, are independent of them. Players’
moves in the quantum game are classical in being a linear combination (with real & normalized
coefficients) of the two choices available to each player. However, in contrast to the situation in a
classical game (in which the chosen strategies directly determine the payoff entries in the payoff
matrix), our setting demands that players’ payoffs not only depend on their moves but also that
these depend on what kind of physical system players share in order to play the game. We achieve
this by making the payoff relations to depend also on the joint probabilities relevant to the shared
physical system and then ask whether a joint probability distribution exists. As for a quantum
mechanical shared physical system the joint probabilities can go beyond the constraints permitted
to classical joint probabilities, allowing us to obtain our quantum game.
As the joint probabilities are normalized we have
P (A1B1) + P (A1B¯1) + P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B¯1) = 1,
P (A1B2) + P (A1B¯2) + P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2) = 1,
P (A2B1) + P (A2B¯1) + P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B¯1) = 1,
P (A2B2) + P (A2B¯2) + P (A¯2B2) + P (A¯2B¯2) = 1, (6)
and thus each one of the relations (5) represents a classical mixed strategy payoff. The causal
communication constraint [53] for the joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2) now
states that
P (A1B1) + P (A1B¯1) = P (A1B2) + P (A1B¯2), P (A1B1) + P (A¯1B1) = P (A2B1) + P (A¯2B1),
P (A2B1) + P (A2B¯1) = P (A2B2) + P (A2B¯2), P (A1B2) + P (A¯1B2) = P (A2B2) + P (A¯2B2),
P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B¯1) = P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2), P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B¯1) = P (A¯2B2) + P (A¯2B¯2),
P (A1B¯1) + P (A¯1B¯1) = P (A2B¯1) + P (A¯2B¯1), P (A1B¯2) + P (A¯1B¯2) = P (A2B¯2) + P (A¯2B¯2).
(7)
Using Eqs. (6,7) it can be shown [53] that 8 out of 16 joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and
j = 1, 2) can be eliminated.
With the payoff relations (4) the Nash inequalities for an arbitrary pair of strategies (x⋆, y⋆)
are written as
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x){y⋆{a1[P (A1B1)− P (A1B2)− P (A2B1) + P (A2B2)] +
a2[P (A1B¯1)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A2B¯1) + P (A2B¯2)] +
a3[P (A¯1B1)− P (A¯1B2)− P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B2)] +
a4[P (A¯1B¯1)− P (A¯1B¯2)− P (A¯2B¯1) + P (A¯2B¯2)]} +
{a1[P (A1B2)− P (A2B2)] + a2[P (A1B¯2)− P (A2B¯2)] +
a3[P (A¯1B2)− P (A¯2B2)] + a4[P (A¯1B¯2)− P (A¯2B¯2)]}} ≥ 0, (8)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y){x⋆{b1[P (A1B1)− P (A1B2)− P (A2B1) + P (A2B2)] +
b2[P (A1B¯1)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A2B¯1) + P (A2B¯2)] +
b3[P (A¯1B1)− P (A¯1B2)− P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B2)] +
b4[P (A¯1B¯1)− P (A¯1B¯2)− P (A¯2B¯1) + P (A¯2B¯2)]}+
{b1[P (A2B1)− P (A2B2)] + b2[P (A2B¯1)− P (A2B¯2)] +
b3[P (A¯2B1)− P (A¯2B2)] + b4[P (A¯2B¯1)− P (A¯2B¯2)]}} ≥ 0. (9)
Notice that with respect to the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 , if it exists, the given
joints PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2) can be expressed as their marginals. For instance
P (A2B¯1) = P (A1A2B¯1B2) + P (A1A2B¯1B¯2) + P (A¯1A2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A2B¯1B¯2). (10)
Similar expressions can be written for P (AiBj), P (A¯iBj), and P (A¯iB¯j) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2.
In the rest of this paper we refer to PAi,Bj as joint probabilities and to PA1,A2,B1,B2 as the joint
probability distribution.
4 Fine’s analysis
At this stage we refer to a result reported in early 1980s by Arthur Fine [63] stating that Bell’s
inequalities form both necessary and sufficient conditions in order to find a joint probability
distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 whose marginals are the joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and
j = 1, 2). For the case when Bell’s inequalities hold, Fine describes how to find the probability
distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 from the joints probabilities PAi,Bj , in terms of which the inequalities
are usually expressed.
Fine presents two theorems, the first of which states that if A, B, B′ are bivalent observables,
each mapping into {+1,−1} with given joint distributions PA,B, PA,B′ and PB,B′ , then the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of a joint distribution PA,B,B′ , compatible with
the given joints for the pairs, is the satisfaction of following system of inequalities:
P (A) + P (B) + P (B′) ≤ 1 + P (AB) + P (AB′) + P (BB′),
P (AB) + P (AB′) ≤ P (A) + P (BB′),
P (AB) + P (BB′) ≤ P (B) + P (AB′),
P (AB′) + P (BB′) ≤ P (B′) + P (AB), (11)
where P (·) denotes the probability that each enclosed observable takes the value +1.
Fine’s second theorem [63] states that if A1, A2, B1, B2 are bivalent observables with joint
distributions PAi ,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2), then the necessary and sufficient condition for
there to exist a joint distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 compatible with the given joints is that the following
system of Bell’s inequalities is satisfied:
− 1 ≤ P (AiBj) + P (AiBj′ ) + P (Ai′Bj′)− P (Ai′Bj)− P (Ai)− P (Bj′ ) ≤ 0, (12)
for i 6= i′ = 1, 2 and j 6= j′ = 1, 2. The second theorem becomes particularly relevant as it relates
to the setting of quantum correlation experiments that we use in this paper to play a quantum
game.
By these theorems Fine finds the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 by letting n = 1, 2
and m 6= k = 1, 2 and by setting
γ = min {P (AnBm) + P (Bk)− P (AnBk), P (Bm), P (Bk)} . (13)
Afterwards, by defining P (B1B2) = γ Fine fills the rest of the distribution by letting
P (B¯1B2) = P (B1)− γ,
P (B1B¯2) = P (B2)− γ,
P (B¯1B¯2) = 1− P (B1)− P (B2) + γ. (14)
Fine then defines two quantities α and β as
α = P (A1B1B2) = γP (A1), β = P (A2B1B2) = γP (A2) (15)
to find the distributions PA1,B1,B2 and PA2,B1,B2 as given below.
P (A1B1B¯2) = P (A1B1)− α,
P (A1B¯1B2) = P (A1B2)− α,
P (A1B¯1B¯2) = P (A1)− P (A1B1)− P (A1B2) + α,
P (A¯1B1B2) = P (B1B2)− α,
P (A¯1B1B¯2) = P (B1)− P (A1B1)− P (B1B2) + α,
P (A¯1B¯1B2) = P (B2)− P (A1B2)− P (B1B2) + α,
P (A¯1B¯1B¯2) = 1− P (A1)− P (B1)− P (B2) + P (A1B1) + P (A1B2) + P (B1B2)− α,
(16)
and
P (A2B1B¯2) = P (A2B1)− β,
P (A2B¯1B2) = P (A2B2)− β,
P (A2B¯1B¯2) = P (A2)− P (A2B1)− P (A2B2) + β,
P (A¯2B1B2) = P (B1B2)− β,
P (A¯2B1B¯2) = P (B1)− P (A2B1)− P (B1B2) + β,
P (A¯2B¯1B2) = P (B2)− P (A2B2)− P (B1B2) + β,
P (A¯2B¯1B¯2) = 1− P (A2)− P (B1)− P (B2) + P (A2B1) + P (A2B2) + P (B1B2)− β,
(17)
from which the distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 can easily be found.
In the following, while using Fine’s analysis, we analyze the quantum games of Prisoners’s
Dilemma (PD) and Matching Pennies (MP) played in the setting of quantum correlation ex-
periments. We have selected these games because both games have been analyzed earlier in
Refs. [35, 44] using the concept of non-factorizable joint probabilities. This will provide us an
opportunity to find how the outcomes of these quantum games compare when the games are
studied using the present approach built up on Fine’s analysis and the approach building up
on the joint probabilities becoming non-factorizable. Using the concept of non-factorizable joint
probabilities, the quantum PD game produces no new outcome over the classical one. Using the
same procedure for quantum MP game, however, results in new non-classical NE when the players
share a entangled state that maximally violates the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of
correlations.
A second reason to chose these games is that classically each of these two games have only one
NE—a pure one for PD and mixed one for MP. As it is the case with the approach using non-
factorizable joint probabilities, the present approach, based on Fine’s analysis, also uses constraints
on joint probabilities that are associated with a particular NE. The situation of having a unique
classical NE presents a more easily tractable case when we are considering constraints on quantum
mechanical joint probabilities, relative to the case when multiple NE exist for a game and we have
to separately consider constraints on joint probabilities for each of them.
5 Analysis of the quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma game
We now refer to the matrix (1) and consider the PD game for which we have a3 > a1 > a4 > a2
and as it is a symmetric game we have
(
a1 a2
a3 a4
)T
=
(
b1 b2
b3 b4
)
, (18)
where T is for transpose. Referring to (3) we then have △1,△2 > 0 and ∆1 = b2 − b1 and
∆2 = b4 − b3. The strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) can be shown to emerge as a NE for this game
at which we have ΠA(0, 0) = a4 and ΠB(0, 0) = b4.
To consider the quantum version of this game played using the setting of quantum correlation
experiments, we consider the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) for which we define
△x⋆=0 = ΠA(0, 0)− ΠA(x, 0), △y⋆=0 = ΠB(0, 0)−ΠB(0, y). (19)
For this strategy pair, we insert from Eqs. (10) into the inequalities (8,9) to obtain
△x⋆=0 = x[△1
{
P (A1A¯2B1B2)− P (A¯1A2B1B2)− P (A¯1A2B¯1B2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B2)
}
+
△2
{
P (A1A¯2B1B¯2)− P (A¯1A2B1B¯2)− P (A¯1A2B¯1B¯2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B¯2)
}
],
△y⋆=0 = y[△1
{
P (A1A2B1B¯2)− P (A1A2B¯1B2)− P (A¯1A2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A2B1B¯2)
}
+
△2
{
P (A1A¯2B1B¯2)− P (A1A¯2B¯1B2)− P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A¯2B1B¯2)
}
], (20)
that express △x⋆=0 and △y⋆=0 in terms of the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 .
We now demand that the strategy pair (0, 0) emerges as a NE when players share a classical
physical system. For this we impose the following two requirements: When the system of Bell’s
inequalities (12) holds we have: a) Nash inequalities for the strategy pair (0, 0) hold i.e. △x⋆=0 ≥ 0,
△y⋆=0 ≥ 0 and b) the payoffs for players Alice and Bob at the strategy pair (0, 0) are a4 and
b4, respectively. These requirements ensure that a faithful realization of the original game exists
within the quantum game constructed using the setting of quantum correlation experiments.
A keen reader may ask here why the converse situation is not adopted i.e. to require that if
△x⋆=0 ≥ 0 and △y⋆=0 ≥ 0 then the system of Bell’s inequalities holds. Unfortunately, this is
not a valid requirement as the violation of Bell’s inequalities does not necessarily lead to a new
non-classical NE, and we well may have △x⋆=0 ≥ 0 and △y⋆=0 ≥ 0 even when the system of Bell’s
inequalities is violated.
These requirements remind us of Fine’s second theorem, while Eqs. (16,17) allow us to find
the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 . Using Eqs. (16,17) we, therefore, re-express the
quantities △x⋆=0 and △y⋆=0 in Eqs. (20) in terms of the joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2
and j = 1, 2) to obtain
P (A1A¯2B1B2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B2)− P (A¯1A2B1B2)−
P (A¯1A2B¯1B2) = [P (A1)− P (A2)]P (B2),
P (A1A¯2B1B¯2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B¯2)− P (A¯1A2B1B¯2)−
P (A¯1A2B¯1B¯2) = [P (A1)− P (A2)][1 − P (B2)],
P (A1A2B1B¯2) + P (A¯1A2B1B¯2)− P (A1A2B¯1B2)−
P (A¯1A2B¯1B2) = [P (B1)− P (B2)]P (A2),
P (A1A¯2B1B¯2) + P (A¯1A¯2B1B¯2)− P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B2)−
P (A1A¯2B¯1B2) = [P (B1)− P (B2)][1 − P (A2)], (21)
and the Nash inequalities for the strategy pair (0, 0) then take a simpler form
△x⋆=0 = x[P (A1)− P (A2)][(△1/△2 − 1)P (B2) + 1]△2 ≥ 0,
△y⋆=0 = y[P (B1)− P (B2)][(△1/△2 − 1)P (A2) + 1]△2 ≥ 0, (22)
giving the first set of constraints on joint probabilities as
P (A1) ≥ P (A2), P (B1) ≥ P (B2). (23)
Similarly, below we translate the requirement b) into the second set of constraints on joint
probabilities. Consider the relations (4) to find players’ payoffs at the strategy pair (0, 0) as
ΠA,B(0, 0) = (a, b)1P (A2B2) + (a, b)2P (A2B¯2) + (a, b)3P (A¯2B2) + (a, b)4P (A¯2B¯2), (24)
which, as is the case for a), we express using Eqs. (10) in terms of the joint probability distribution
PA1,A2,B1,B2 as
ΠA,B(0, 0) = (a, b)1{P (A1A2B1B2) + P (A1A2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A2B1B2) + P (A¯1A2B¯1B2)}+
(a, b)2{P (A1A2B1B¯2) + P (A1A2B¯1B¯2) + P (A¯1A2B1B¯2) + P (A¯1A2B¯1B¯2)}+
(a, b)3{P (A1A¯2B1B2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A¯2B1B2) + P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B2)}+
(a, b)4{P (A1A¯2B1B¯2) + P (A1A¯2B¯1B¯2) + P (A¯1A¯2B1B¯2) + P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B¯2)}. (25)
Observing that we assume that Bell’s inequalities hold, at this stage, once again, we refer to
Fine’s second theorem and insert the probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 given by Eqs. (16,17)
into Eq. (25) in order to re-express it in terms of joint probabilities PAi,Bj (for i = 1, 2 and
j = 1, 2). This interestingly leads to obtaining (24) again.
Note that the requirement b) states that when Bell’s inequalities hold, Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs
at the strategy pair (0, 0) are a4 and b4, respectively. To find what constraints this puts on joint
probabilities PAi,Bj , we re-express (24) as
ΠA(0, 0) = (a2 − a4)P (A2) + (a3 − a4)P (B2) + (a1 − a2 − a3 + a4)P (A2B2) + a4,
ΠB(0, 0) = (b2 − b4)P (A2) + (b3 − b4)P (B2) + (b1 − b2 − b3 + b4)P (A2B2) + b4, (26)
and then set ΠA(0, 0) = a4 and ΠB(0, 0) = b4 to obtain
P (A2) = 0 = P (B2), (27)
which defines the second set of constraints on joint probabilities.
The above analysis allows us to look forward to the situation when a joint probability distribu-
tion PA1,A2,B1,B2 does not exist and/or cannot be found from PAi,Bj—a situation that corresponds
when Bell’s inequalities are violated. We will consider this under the assumption that the con-
straints on PAi,Bj , that are obtained above and are given by the inequalities (22), continue to hold
true. This assumption guarantees that the classical game, with its particular outcome and the
corresponding payoffs, emerges when Bell’s inequalities hold and thus the classical game remains
embedded within the corresponding quantum game.
Fine’s analysis is used in above to find the constraints (23,27) that we insert, in the following
step, into Eqs. (8,9), that are relevant to a general strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆), to find if a strategy pair
that is different from the classical case of (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0), emerges as a NE when the system of
Bell’s inequalities (12) is violated and, therefore, a probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 cannot
be found whose marginals are PAi,Bj . This leads us to obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x)[y⋆(1 −△1/△2)P (B1)− 1]△2P (A1) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y)[x⋆(1−△1/△2)P (A1)− 1]△2P (B1) ≥ 0. (28)
Now, as △1,△2 > 0 these inequalities once again generate the outcome (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0). No new
NE, therefore, emerges for PD even when Bell’s inequalities are violated and the quantum game
generates the same outcome as does the classical game.
6 Analysis of the quantum Matching Pennies game
The Matching Pennies (MP) game involves two players Alice and Bob and each player has a penny
that s/he secretly flips to heads H or tails T . Players are not permitted to communicate and they
disclose their strategies to a referee who organizes the game. If the referee finds that the two
pennies match (both heads or both tails), he takes one dollar from Bob and gives it to Alice (+1
for Alice, −1 for Bob) and if the pennies mismatch (one heads and one tails), the referee takes one
dollar from Alice and gives it to Bob (−1 for Alice, +1 for Bob). As one player’s gain is exactly
equal to the other player’s loss the game is zero-sum with the payoff matrix
Alice
H
T
Bob
H T(
(+1,−1) (−1,+1)
(−1,+1) (+1,−1)
)
. (29)
No pure strategy NE [55] exists and a unique mixed strategy NE emerges in which both players
select the strategiesH and T with the probability of 1/2. At the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2)
players receive ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = 0 = ΠB(1/2, 1/2).
As in the quantum game the Eq. (4) give the players’ payoff relations, for a NE strategy pair
(x⋆, y⋆) we obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = [y⋆ {ΠA(S1, S′1)−ΠA(S2, S′1)−ΠA(S1, S′2) + ΠA(S2, S′2)}
+ {ΠA(S1, S′2)−ΠA(S2, S′2)}](x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = [x⋆ {ΠB(S1, S′1)−ΠB(S1, S′2)−ΠB(S2, S′1) + ΠB(S2, S′2)}
+ {ΠB(S2, S′1)−ΠB(S2, S′2)}](y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (30)
where Eqs. (5) and the matrix (29) gives
ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = P (A1B1)− P (A1B¯1)− P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B¯1) = −ΠB(S1, S′1),
ΠA(S1, S
′
2) = P (A1B2)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2) = −ΠB(S1, S′2),
ΠA(S2, S
′
1) = P (A2B1)− P (A2B¯1)− P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B¯1) = −ΠB(S2, S′1),
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = P (A2B2)− P (A2B¯2)− P (A¯2B2) + P (A¯2B¯2) = −ΠB(S2, S′2). (31)
The right sides of these Equations express the fact that, as it is the case with the classical game,
the quantum game is also zero-sum game.
As it was the case for the PD game, we define
△x⋆=1/2 = ΠA(1/2, 1/2)−ΠA(x, 1/2), △y⋆=1/2 = ΠB(1/2, 1/2)−ΠB(1/2, y), (32)
and insert from Eqs. (31) into Eqs. (30) to obtain
△x⋆=1/2 = (1/2)[P (A1B1)− P (A1B¯1)− P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B¯1)
−P (A2B1) + P (A2B¯1) + P (A¯2B1)− P (A¯2B¯1)
P (A1B2)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2)
−P (A2B2) + P (A2B¯2) + P (A¯2B2)− P (A¯2B¯2)](1/2− x) ≥ 0, (33)
and
△y⋆=1/2 = (1/2)[−P (A1B1) + P (A1B¯1) + P (A¯1B1)− P (A¯1B¯1)
P (A1B2)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2)
−P (A2B1) + P (A2B¯1) + P (A¯2B1)− P (A¯2B¯1)
P (A2B2)− P (A2B¯2)− P (A¯2B2) + P (A¯2B¯2)](1/2− y) ≥ 0. (34)
We now insert from Eqs. (10) into Eqs. (33, 34) to obtain
△x⋆=1/2 = 2[P (A1A¯2B1B2)− P (A1A¯2B¯1B¯2)− P (A¯1A2B1B2) + P (A¯1A2B¯1B¯2)](1/2− x),
(35)
△y⋆=1/2 = 2[P (A1A2B¯1B2)− P (A1A2B1B¯2)− P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B2) + P (A¯1A¯2B1B¯2)](1/2− y),
(36)
that express △x⋆=1/2 and △y⋆=1/2 in terms of the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 . As
it was the case with the PD game, at this stage we demand that the strategy pair (1/2, 1/2)
results as a NE when players share a classical physical system, for which the system (12) of Bell’s
inequalities hold and the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 can be found from PAi,Bj using
Fine’s second theorem. It, therefore, seems natural to impose the following two requirements:
When the system of Bell’s inequalities (12) hold we have: a) Nash inequalities for the strategy
pair (1/2, 1/2) hold i.e. △x⋆=1/2 ≥ 0, △y⋆=1/2 ≥ 0, b) the payoffs for players Alice and Bob at
the strategy pair (1/2, 1/2) are zero both.
As has been the case with the PD game, a keen reader may ask here why the converse situation
is not adopted: to require that if △x⋆=1/2 ≥ 0 and △y⋆=1/2 ≥ 0 then the system of Bell’s
inequalities holds. As the violation of the system of Bell’s inequalities does not necessarily lead
to a new non-classical NE, and we well may have △x⋆=1/2 ≥ 0 and △y⋆=1/2 ≥ 0 even when Bell’s
inequalities are violated, we consider it not to be a valid requirement.
To address a) we require that if the probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 , obtained from Fine’s
second theorem, is inserted in Eqs. (35,36) then we have △x⋆=1/2 ≥ 0 and △y⋆=1/2 ≥ 0. Inserting
from Eqs. (16,17) to Eqs. (35,36) reduces them to simpler form:
△x⋆=1/2 = 2[P (A2)− P (A1)][1− P (B1)− P (B2)](1/2− x) ≥ 0,
△y⋆=1/2 = 2[P (B1)− P (B2)][1− P (A1)− P (A2)](1/2− y) ≥ 0, (37)
which defines the first set of constraints on joint probabilities as
[P (A2)− P (A1)][1− P (B1)− P (B2)] = 0, (38)
[P (B1)− P (B2)][1 − P (A1)− P (A2)] = 0. (39)
Now we translate the requirement b) into the second set of constraints on joint probabilities.
Consider the relations (4) to find players’ payoffs at the strategy pair (1/2, 1/2) as
ΠA,B(1/2, 1/2) = (1/4){ΠA,B(S1, S′1) + ΠA,B(S1, S′2) + ΠA,B(S2, S′1) + ΠA,B(S2, S′2)}, (40)
where
ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = P (A1B1)− P (A1B¯1)− P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B¯1) = −ΠB(S1, S′1),
ΠA(S1, S
′
2) = P (A1B2)− P (A1B¯2)− P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯1B¯2) = −ΠB(S1, S′2),
ΠA(S2, S
′
1) = P (A2B1)− P (A2B¯1)− P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B¯1) = −ΠB(S2, S′1),
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = P (A2B2)− P (A2B¯2)− P (A¯2B2) + P (A¯2B¯2) = −ΠB(S2, S′2).
(41)
Inserting (41) in (40) gives
ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = (1/4)[{P (A1B1) + P (A1B2) + P (A2B1) + P (A2B2) + P (A¯1B¯1)+
P (A¯1B¯2) + P (A¯2B¯1) + P (A¯2B¯2)} − {P (A1B¯1) + P (A1B¯2) + P (A2B¯1)+
P (A2B¯2) + P (A¯1B1) + P (A¯1B2) + P (A¯2B1) + P (A¯2B2)}] = −ΠB(1/2, 1/2). (42)
We now insert from Eqs. (10) into the payoff (42) in order to express it in terms of the joint
probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 to obtain
ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = P (A1A2B1B2)− P (A1A2B¯1B¯2)− P (A¯1A¯2B1B2) + P (A¯1A¯2B¯1B¯2). (43)
As Bell’s inequalities are assumed to hold, at this stage we refer to Fine’s second theorem and
insert the probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 given by Eqs. (16,17) into Eq. (43) in order to
re-express it in terms of joint probabilities:
ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = [P (B1) + P (B2)][P (A1) + P (A2)− 1]− [(1 + β)P (A1) + (1− α)P (A2)]. (44)
Now the requirement b) states that when Bell’s inequalities hold, Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs for the
strategy pair (1/2, 1/2) are both zero, giving us the second constraint on joint probabilities:
[P (B1) + P (B2)][P (A1) + P (A2)− 1] = [(1 + β)P (A1) + (1− α)P (A2)]. (45)
After some manipulation, the constraints (38,39,45) can be re-expressed as
P (A1B2) = [(2 + β)P (A1) + P (B1) + P (B2)− αP (A2)]/2− P (A1B1), (46)
P (A2B1) = [(1− α)P (A2) + 2P (B1) + (1 + β)P (A1)− 2P (A1B1)]/2, (47)
P (A2B2) = [2P (A1B1) + P (A2) + P (B2)− P (A1)− P (B1)]/2. (48)
To find if the violation of Bell’s inequalities may lead to a NE, which is different from the
classical NE of (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2), we consider Eqs. (31) to obtain
ΠA(S1, S
′
1)−ΠA(S2, S′1)−ΠA(S1, S′2)+
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = 4[P (A1B1)− P (A2B1)− P (A1B2)],
ΠA(S1, S
′
2)−ΠA(S2, S′2) = 2{2[P (A1B2)− P (A2B2)]+
[P (A2)− P (A1)]}. (49)
We now substitute the constraints given by Eqs. (46,47,48) into (49) to obtain
ΠA(S1, S
′
1)−ΠA(S2, S′1)−ΠA(S1, S′2)+
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = 4[4P (A1B1)− (2 + β)P (A1) + αP (A2)− 2P (B1)],
ΠA(S1, S
′
2)−ΠA(S2, S′2) = 2[(2 + β)P (A1)− 4P (A1B1) + 2P (B1)− αP (A2)]. (50)
This allows to write the two inequalities in (30) as
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = 4Ω(y⋆ − 1/2)(x⋆ − x) ≥ 0, (51)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −4Ω(x⋆ − 1/2)(y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (52)
where
Ω = 4P (A1B1)− (2 + β)P (A1) + αP (A2)− 2P (B1). (53)
Now, the inequalities (51,52) state that although the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) remains
a NE also in the quantum game, for which the system (12) of Bell’s inequalities is violated, any
pair of strategies will become a NE when Ω = 0.
Cereceda reports in Ref. [53] that, corresponding to a maximally entangled bipartite state,
there exist two sets of joint probabilities, which maximally violate the CHSH sum of correlations
while satisfying the constraints (6,7) that are given by normalization and causal communication
constraint. To define these probability sets Cereceda divides the 16 joint probabilities into two
sets:
ν =
{
P (A1B¯1), P (A¯1B1), P (A1B¯2), P (A¯1B2), P (A2B¯1), P (A¯2B1), P (A2B2), P (A¯2B¯2)
}
,
µ =
{
P (A1B1), P (A¯1B¯1), P (A1B2), P (A¯1B¯2), P (A2B1), P (A¯2B¯1), P (A2B¯2), P (A¯2B2)
}
.
(54)
In terms of these the first probability set is then given as
Pl = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all Pl ∈ µ, and Pm = (2−
√
2)/8 for all Pm ∈ ν, (55)
whereas the second probability set is given as
Pl = (2−
√
2)/8 for all Pl ∈ µ, and Pm = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all Pm ∈ ν. (56)
These two sets, while being consistent with the normalization and causal communication con-
straints given by Eqs. (6,7), provide the maximum absolute limit of 2
√
2 for the CHSH sum of
correlations.
To evaluate Ω for these two probability sets we use the definition (13) to find γ for n = 1, 2
and m 6= k = 1, 2. We, therefore, consider the quantities
[P (A1B1) + P (B2)− P (A1B2), P (B1), P (B2)],
[P (A1B2) + P (B1)− P (A1B1), P (B2), P (B1)],
[P (A2B1) + P (B2)− P (A2B2), P (B1), P (B2)],
[P (A2B2) + P (B1)− P (A2B1), P (B2), P (B1)]. (57)
The first of which, for example, is expressed as
{[P (A1B1) + P (A1B¯1) + P (A1B2) + P (A1B¯2)][P (A1B1) + P (A¯1B1) +
P (A2B1) + P (A¯2B1)] + [P (A1B2) + P (A¯1B2) + P (A2B2) + P (A¯2B2)]−
[P (A1B1) + P (A1B¯1) + P (A1B2) + P (A1B¯2)][P (A1B2) + P (A¯1B2) +
P (A2B2) + P (A¯2B2)], [P (A1B1) + P (A¯1B1) + P (A2B1) + P (A¯2B1)],
[P (A1B2) + P (A¯1B2) + P (A2B2) + P (A¯2B2)]}, (58)
which reduces itself to {1, 1, 1} for the probability set (55). The same is the case with the remaining
expressions of (57) for this probability set. So we obtain γ = 1 that gives Ω = 0. Similarly, for
the probability set (56) we also obtain Ω = 0. In view of the Inequalities (51,52), in the quantum
MP game with players sharing a maximally entangled state to play the game, this results in any
strategy set (x⋆, y⋆) being a NE. As for γ = 1 we obtain α = P (A1) and β = P (A2) from Eq. (15),
the constraints (46,47,48) are satisfied for both the probability sets in Eqs. (55,56).
7 Discussion
As the present paper builds up on our earlier work that constructs quantum games from non-
factorizable joint probabilities [35], its brief review is in order. That work also uses the setting
of a quantum correlation experiment and players’s strategies are classical as is the case in the
present approach. A classical game is re-expressed in terms of factorizable joint probabilities
relevant to a shared physical system under the assumption that factorizable joint probabilities
correspond to classicality. It is found that by requiring a classical outcome of the game to emerge
for factorizable joint probabilities results in constraints on the joint probabilities. These constraints
ensure that the classical game corresponding to factorizable joint probabilities remains a subset
of the quantum game. Retaining these constraints and allowing the joint probabilities to become
non-factorizable leads to the corresponding quantum game. When played in this setting, it is found
that new quantum mechanical NE emerge, for instance, for the game of Matching Pennies [44]
that correspond, interestingly, to the sets of joint probabilities that maximally violate the CHSH
inequality [52].
The relation, however, which this approach establishes between the classicality of the shared
physical system, as expressed by a system of Bell’s inequalities, and a classical game is not straight-
forward. It is because Bell’s inequalities may not be violated even when the corresponding set
of joint probabilities is non-factorizable i.e. non-factorizability is necessary but not sufficient to
violate Bell’s inequalities. A suggested explanation can be to state that such a game resides in the
so-called pseudo-classical domain, where Bell’s inequalities are not violated, and where a quantum
game is treated as if players are simultaneously playing several classical games [27].
The present paper introduces a new approach to quantize a two-player two-strategy game.
This approach, once again, uses the setting of quantum correlation experiments in which players’
strategies remain classical. The quantum game is now obtained from the non-classical feature
of the shared physical system consisting of the violation of Bell’s inequalities. This situation
corresponds when a joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 does not exist, whose marginals
are the joint probabilities PAi,Bj .
The argument presented in this paper can be described as follows. We begin by putting
a classical game into a suitable format that permits us to consider the situation when a joint
probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 , whose marginals are the joint probabilities PAi,Bj , does
not exist. We obtain this format by expressing players’ payoff relations in terms of the joint
probabilities PAi,Bj . With the payoff relations expressed in this way we select an arbitrary strategy
pair (x⋆, y⋆) and find constraints on the joint probabilities PAi,Bj that produce this NE and its
corresponding classical payoffs to the players. Assuming that a joint probability distribution
PA1,A2,B1,B2 exists that can be found from Fine’s second theorem, we re-express the obtained
constraints in terms of the joint probability distribution. We take the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) to be
the NE of the classical game, and players’ payoffs for this strategy pair to be their payoffs in the
classical game. This allows us to use Eqs. (16,17) and to express obtained constraints on the joint
probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 as constraints on joint probabilities PAi,Bj . The obtained
constraints ensure that when the system of Bell’s inequalities holds we obtain the classical NE
as the outcome of the game. The quantum game is then obtained by retaining these constraints
while allowing the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 not to exist. Considering a particular
game we then investigate if this leads to NE that are non-classical.
We investigate games of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Matching Pennies both of which have been
studied earlier using other quantization schemes [5,35,44]. For PD we find that when the system
of Bell’s inequalities does not hold, and a joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 does not
exist, this cannot change or shift the classical NE of the game. For this game an identical result
was reported in Ref. [35] using non-factorizable joint probabilities. For MP we find that in this
quantization scheme the classical NE remains intact even when the system (12) of Bell’s inequalities
is violated and the joint probability distribution PA1,A2,B1,B2 does not exist. However, when a
maximally entangled state is shared between players, any pair of strategies becomes a NE. This
result diverges away from the one obtained earlier [44] using non-factorizable joint probabilities.
We believe it is because non-factorizability is not equivalent to a joint probability distribution
PA1,A2,B1,B2 not existing—a situation that motivates this paper. This analysis confirms that an
outcome of a quantum game is dependent on the quantization route taken.
The results obtained show that for quantum games played in the setting of quantum correlation
experiments the sharing of quantum resources does not always lead to players doing better than
what they can do in the classical game. Players sharing a quantum system (for which Bell’s
inequalities are violated) do not automatically become better off relative to the ones who share
classical system in order to physically implement the same game. This is observed to be the case
with the game of PD. On the contrary, for the game of MP the situation becomes quite different
as players’ sharing of the quantum system (that corresponds to a maximally entangled state) leads
to the situation of any pair of strategies existing as NE. It, therefore, shows that the consequence
of sharing of a quantum system depends on the particular original classical game the players play.
This is in agreement with the results reported earlier by Shimamura et al. [23] showing that within
Eisert et al.’s quantization scheme [5] certain quantum states cannot be used to quantize certain
classical games as by doing so classical results cannot be reproduced. Our results convey the same
message though the quantum games we consider are constructed directly from Bell’s inequalities.
An interesting question is to ask about the consequence the new quantum solutions have regard-
ing the original considered game. We believe that the new quantum solutions have a consequence
regarding the original considered game only when a classical game emerges due to classicality
of the shared physical system—in the sense that when the shared physical system does not vio-
late Bell’s inequalities the resulting game attains a classical interpretation (both in terms of the
players’ payoffs and the resulting pair of strategies defining the NE).
Some of the known criticisms of quantum games can be stated as follows: a) a quantum game
is an ad-hoc construction that does not teach us anything new about quantum mechanics, b) it is
known in game theory that if you change the rules of an old game, you get a new game. The fact
that new NE appear in the quantum game is not surprising and does not imply anything about
the old game, c) by including the new ‘quantum’ moves in a pay-off matrix, one can reformulate
the quantum game as a purely classical game [10] with players having access to an extended set
of available pure strategies.
In reply to a) we state that a quantum game offers a reasonable way to extend a classical game
towards quantum domain and such an extension cannot, and should not, be assumed to open new
avenues for quantum mechanics. However, it is the game theory for which a new avenue is opened
in that taking a game to the quantum regime is found to have consequences for the outcome the
considered game. In reply to b) we state that any construction of a quantum game is an extension
of the original game and therefore the rules for playing this extended game also need to take
into account the particular extension made. The rules of the extended game are relevant to the
new game and therefore cannot be expected to remain identical to the ones in the original game.
Under reasonable conditions, however, the extended game and its rules, should be reducible to
the original game. In the construction we develop here, the reasonable constraints are a system
of Bell’s inequalities. In reply to c) we state that as in the present construction a quantum game
corresponds only when Bell’s inequalities, relevant to the shared physical system, are violated,
and that the classical game corresponds when this system holds. As players’ strategies remain
classical in the quantum game, this offers the closest situation without changing the rules of the
game—especially when compared to the usual case in which players’ allowed strategy sets are
extended to unitary transformations.
In the setting we use, the players strategies become dependent on the shared physical system
via the payoff relations. For a shared system that exhibits quantum correlations, this may give
the impression that the game is changed from a non-cooperative game to a cooperative game
with different rules. We agree that it is possible to model our quantum game by introducing, for
instance, pre-play negotiations into the standard setting of a non-cooperative game. Our objective,
however, is different in that we ask how the violation of Bell’s inequalities by the shared physical
system impacts the outcome of a non-cooperative game. The possibility of modeling this impact
by introducing some kind of cooperation between the players cannot be equated to changing a
non-cooperative game into an explicitly cooperative game.
Agreeing with the earlier reported results [8, 9, 11, 24, 26, 29] this paper shows that players
sharing a quantum mechanical system may or may result in new outcomes as this depends on the
original classical game. Secondly, we present the first analysis that directly exploits a system of
Bell’s inequalities, together with Fine’s results, establishing a direct link between a system of Bell’s
inequalities and the existence of a joint probability distribution in the construction of quantum
games. Possible directions for further investigation may include expressing the outcome(s) of a
quantum game in terms of the amount of the violation of Bell’s inequalities such that they are
reduced to classical outcomes when there exists no violation. We believe the quantization approach
proposed in this paper can be extended to multi-player games if Fine’s results could be accordingly
extended to more than 4 bivalent observables.
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